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The idea behind debt conversion is that instead  tions, inadequate sources of information in the
of continuing to make payments on outstanding  decisionmaking machinery, and inadequate
loans in hard currency in the face of debt servic-  managerial and administrative skills.
ing difficulties, the debtors find some other way
to settle debts that is satisfactory to themselves  Debt conversion projects may be a useful,
and the creditor. In particular, debt for develop-  noncontroversial vehicle for bringing in domes-
ment can be a useful way to stabilize a growing  tic managerial talent from local nor,govemmeni
debt stock, for example, by converting amounts  organizations on contract (for example, to a
which are already in arrears.  ministry) to be responsible for implemcntation
-to  makc the  project  "deliverable."
Mukherjee discusscs the relat.ve importance
of debt conversion as a development tool,  One instrumen! for allowing this to happen is
contrasts conversion of debt owed to public and  a trust fund. The trustec has legal title ovcr the
private creditors, touches G.o  tne  issue of its  fund and a fiduciary'  responsibility to the benefi-
impact on inflation, and examines criteria for  ciaries to follow the terms and comply with
deciding which types of debt are suitable for  applicable laws. National environmental trust
conversion. She contends that the principle of  funds have been established in several countries
debt conversion could be applied in many  in connection with dcbt-for-naturc swatps.
situations, provides examples, and describes the
mechanics of debt conversion for development  Another is for sector policymakers to
purposes as part of an overall sectoral strategy.  approach intemational counterpart
nongovemment orgarlizations directly to find out
She concludes by discussing two ways to  if therc is interest in funding specific develop-
strengthen institutions for carrying out debt  mcnt activities (especially those which are not
conversions.  eligible for multilateral financing) through dcbt
conversions to support a well-defined sectoral
Large, unanticipatcd inflows of resources  program. The lcsson from debt-for-nature
can create difficult relationships in traditionally  conversions may be that the development
underfunded activities. Creditors often have little  community and banks must work together
confidence that debtors will be able to fulfill  closcly, combining their expertise to provide
project-related obligations because they have  long-terrn resources for development.
inadequate absorptive capacity, weak institu-
ThcPolicy RcscarchWorking PaperScricsdisscminates  the findingsof vork und(tr  'v  11  inthe Bank Anobectivcoftlhc  serics
is to get these fimdings out quickly, even if presensations are less than fully polished  The findings,  inerpretations.  and
iconclusions  in these papers do not necessarily represent official Bank pol icy.
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I.  IntrQduton
Newcomers to debt conversions will find that the underlying idea is relatively
simple.  The  basic  principle is  that instead  of  continuing  to  make  payments  on
outstanding loans in hard currency as in the past, the debtor is able to find some otl'.r
means of settling his debts which is satisfactory  to himself and to the creditor.
This  paper discusses the  relative  importance of  debt  conversions as  a debt
management  tool, touches on the issue of inflationary impact, and examines the criteria
for determining which types of debt would be suitable for such conversions. It proposes
that the debt conversion technique could in principle be applied to a wide variety of
situations, and sketches out a few of them as examples.  A detailed discussion of the
mechanics  of carrying out  a conversion follows,  and  the paper concludes  with a
discussion  of  avenues  for  institutional  strengtnening  in  order  to  carry  out  debt
conversions.
Illustration of a Generic Debt Conversion
thile  to  receive  payment  on  the
debt  is  transferred  to  the  project
debtor
D  \^^  (  "~~~~~~~~~projc 
contractual  n__e
debt  service  @~~"-~-  >  _
loca  currency  payments  replace
debt  servioe  in  foreign  exchange
crdio-2-
The diagram shows the following:
(1)  A stream of hard currency is due  in the form of debt service on
old loans from a sovereign debtorl  to a given creditor, who may
be either a commercial bank or another govemment.  The debt is
"value  impaired",  i.e there  is a  low probability  that  it  will be
serviced on time and in full.
(2)  A "project" is identified  in the debtor country that interests  both
the creditor  and debtor.  In return for some arrangement  related
to the project, the creditor could relinquish his claim to receive all
or  part  of  the  debt  service  payments.  The  project  could  be
designated  as the beneficiary  by the creditor,  and could receive
title to the payments stream flowing from the debtor.
(3)  Following  a  careful  analysis  of  the  expected  budgetary  and
macroeconomic  impact,  the  debtor  would  usually  make  such
payments  to  the  project  in  local  cu.rency,  most  commonly  in
installments  over  an  extended  period.  In  some  debt
conversions,  the debtor  may even turn over a major asset  to the
creditor,  with  no  accompanying  cash  payment,  as  a  one-time
settlement of the future stream of obligations to the creditor.2
There may be one  more step  before (1), involving  a change  in identity  of
the creditor through the secondary market.  This would occur if the  original creditor
did  not  have any  interest  in  a debt conversion,  but only  wished  to  receive  cash
upfront  for the remaining value of his claim, before it eroded further.  The claim
would be sold for cash at a discount relative to face value, to a third party investor
in  the  secondary market.  The investor (who may have identified a potential
"project" already), would hope to realize a positive return on his investment (the
v,chase  price of the claim).  He would then become the new creditor, and nothing
:)uld  change in the diagram starting from Step 1.
Debt conversions have been used to  stimulate direct foreign investment in  the
industrial sector, and to support ongoing privatization programs.3 Fertile grounds for
conversions of  .ommercial  debt have included instances  where:
(i)  a debtor government is facing a foreign exchange liquidity crisis leading to
difficulty in making timely debt service payments to its commercial creditors.
1  The  idea  of debt conversions  or debt swaps  was  obviously  bom  and  perfected  between  private  debtors and creditors. In
the World  Bank context,  we will only examine  its applicability  to sovereign  debtors.
2  Debtor  countries  would  undoubtedly  prefer debt forgiveness.  but it should  be recognized  that there are limits  to such
outright debt reduction. Debt conversions  are an intermediate  means of obtaining debt relief short of actual debt
forgiveness.
3  Occasionally  for large, visible  assets such as airlines  and telecommunications  infrastructure.-3 -
The same government is rich in physical assets however, and has identified a
list of state owned companies  to be privatized. The commercial creditor, or its
representative, agrees to take equity in return for giving up claims to debt
service.  (The  ownership transfer  of  the  asset  wouit  then  constitute  the
"project"  in the above diagram). Alternatively;
(ii)  the creditor accepts a lump sum of local currency in exchange for the debt,
agreeing to use the proceeds to purchase a private sector asset 4 in the debtor
country, thus stimulating  direct foreign investment.
A distinction must be made between debt-equity of the kind mentioned above, and
debt for development.  The essential difference between the two is  that a debt equity
conversion mainlv benefits (and is promoted by) the creditor, while a "debt for good
things" exchange  primarily  benefits a  third party  in  the  debtor country  or  a  local
iiistitution,  and  is  often  not  promoted  by  anyone5. However,  based on  recent
de elopments at the Paris Club, the outlook for debt for development swaps has recently
become more promising.  (The reference to such deals as "swaps" or "conversions" is
based on the fact that they meet the definition: they are a method of settling obligations
that is different from the original contractual arrangements, but mutually satisfactory to
the debtor and creditor).
Debt for  development swaps can be seen as a means of achieving debtor-country
long term goals in areas which have been traditionally underfunded  because of more
pressing short-term needs.  If they are properly structured, these conversions can be a
useful means to  achieving desirable developmental objectives with  the assistance of
creditors and with minimal negative effects on the debtor.  In order to implement such
swaps, debtor governments must be the promoters--they will need to establish debt for
development  programs and to announce  specific guidelines  for the new activities.
Debt for  equity conversion programs may require the passage of controversial
legislation, a well-defined privatization program in place, a social safety net, protracted
negotiations about pricing of  national assets, political debate  on the  role of foreign
ownership etc.  By contrast, debt conversions in  the areas outlined in  this paper are
potentially far simpler, and in  essence represent an additional  source of funding to
activities compatible with overall government strategy for a given sector.  This is done
through  pursuing the sponsorship/financial  backing of an existing cred-tor for development-
related activities.
This  paper  will  attempt  to  address  the  applicability  of  the  debt  conversion
technique in  sectors such as infrastructure,  health, education, and agriculture.  The ideas
developed  in this paper are intended to be adapted  to any situation where:
4  This latter approach has been discredited and is now less frequently adopted.  Reason: it is inflationary if local
currency must be printed for repurchasing  public sector obligations  while the equity investments  take place in the
pnivAt sector.
5  Except for international  conservation  organizations which have sometimes  taken the lead in promoting debt for
nature  swaps,  mainly  in Latin  America.-4-
(i)  externalities are present;
(ii)  there  are  no  foreign exchange  flows  resulting  from  the  investment,  and
presumably  no foreign investor interest; and
(iii)  the project costs are in local currency,  in modest sums but over long periods.
It is widely believed that obtaining assured long-term funding is a crucial factor in
implementing development projects.  Some governments have acknowledged this by
taking measures to  stimulate the creation of trust funds or endowments utilizing debt
conversions. The primary objectives  of establishing  such funds are:
(i)  to mobilize resources otherwise not available,
(ii)  to channel them to specific  development  programs,  and
(iii)  to monitor the implementation  of projects under the designated  programs.
The best known examples to date have been related to environmental projects:
either local or internationally active conservation NGOs have acquired title to the hard
currency debt  owed  by  developing countrv  governments (e.g  Bolivia,  Costa  Rica,
Madagascar).  Title is acquired either through di e~ounted  purchase on  the secondary
market,  or by receiving an outright donation  of the claims from the original creditors. The
NGOs then negotiate with the debtor country to obtain iepayment in local currency at a
favorable rate (i.e repayment based on almost all the face value of the acquired debt).
The understanding is that the (local currency) proceeds will be used for conservation in
the  country concerned.  Depending on  the  costs  of  such  transactions, conservation
organizations may be able to leverage a significant increase in the resources ultimately
available for conservation in the debtor country.  (A total of  17 debt for nature swaps
involving  private commercial  bank debt Lave been concluded  to date, converting  more than
US$10C miilion of debt into about US$60 million of environmental funding at cash
investment  costs of about US$17 million).
Specifically  in  one  case,  the  Costa  Rican government  established  a  Nature
Resources Conservation Fund in  1987, and the National Parks Foundation traded up to
US$5.4 million in commercial  debt papers in exchange for 75% of the face value in local
currency government bonds.  These were structured to mature in 6 years, paying 25%
annual  interest.  The  program  was  oversubscribed  by  donors  and  environmental
organizations donating debt to the National Parks Foundation.  Proceeds are being used
for park  management, land purchases to expand existing parks and for environmental
research and education projects.
Along the same lines, it is suggested here that any highly indebted government
with foreign exchange constraints may wish to try and interest creditors  a  support a
limited set of debt for development programs through debt conversions, on a bilaterally
negotiated basis.  These programs could be of virtually unlimited variety, provided the
sovereign debtor could  demonstrate some "global benefit" similar  to  environmental-5-
conversion projects, or at least some bilateral benefit. It is likely that there would have to
be some sort of explicit sectoral strategy, based on which additional support would be
sought.  In  some sense the debt conve:sion for development mechanism rep!esents
cofinancing without adding to a country's external obligations.  It is even possible that a
wull-run program could attract future additional support (possibly non-financial) from a
new set of sponsors who were never creditors of the country.
Activities  which  could receive  debt  swap support  might include childhood
immunization programs, rural health care facilities, all categories of basic needs projects,
vocational training, primary education for girls, safe drinking water, low income housing,
other infrastructure,  recapitalization/portfolio  cleanup of domestic banks, etc.  In particular,
depending on the needs of the country, the debt conversion can be used to generate local
curec  fnding  for  either  one-time expenditures.  recurrent  expenditurs.  capital
expenditures.  or all three.
The element of  leveraging is important--it should be emphasized that the local
currency cash flows to the project/sector  as a result of debt conversion must be additional,
and should not replace governiment  contributions that would have been made anyway.
(Care should also be taken that the potential of debt conversions does not result in a
skewing of priorities to the perceived needs of donors).  Also, if  such conversions are
provided by the creditor government  in lieu of foreign aid to a debtor country, there will be
an adverse impact on the cash flows of the debtor corresponding to the amount of aid
inflow foregone. We assume that debt for development conversions will be negotiated
independently of offcial  development assistance programs with cmditors. and that they
will not directly result in a one-for-one  reduction in the aid budgets of future years.
The paper wiil consider the potential and desirability of debt for development
arrangements, including the question of institutional capacity and strengthening in the
relevant sector of the debtor economy.
II.  When are  Debt Conversions Relevant?
In  order  for  a  debt  conversion  to  take  place,  the  crelitor  would  have  to
acknowledge that there may be larger amounts of hard currency debt outstanding than
could ever be repaid in full in cash, on market terms.  Such a perception would be broadly
based on  creditworthiness indicators 6 which look for sustainable capacity to transfer
resources abroad to meet debt service obligations.  Specifically, for a sovereign debtor,
persistent current account deficits accompanied  by insufficient capital inflows to maintain
adequate reserves, and the resulting accumulations  of external obligations, ace usually an
indicator of debt service disruptions  soon to follow.
6  These include  debt/GDP,  debt service/exports,  gross interest  payments  due/exports.-6-
A.  ah-t Stock Growing more Rapi ;y than QDP
In fact, the stream of debt service currently flowing may actually be smaller than
the amount which is contractually  owed, resulting in the buildup of arrears. These arrears
are likely to be capitalized,  or added to principal outstanding. The unpaid amounts are in
effect treated by creditors as new involuntary loans extended to the debtor.  This situation
leads  to further  interest obligations on  the unpaid interest obligations, and  hence a
growing debt stock.
B. Relative Importance of  Debt Conversions Compared to  Other  Debt Management
Tools--Stabilization  of Debt Stock
For a highly indebted country with debt servicing difficulties, debt conversions
alone cannot be the way out of the impasse.  In fact, in terms of reduction of debt stock,
debt for development  conversions are likely to have a hardly noticeable effect. 7 A range
of  other creative solutions  and fir.ancing will be required to cut the debt stock sufficiently
and to reduce cash outflows  in the form of debt service  on the remaining debt.
However, while the amounts subject to debt conversions will often be modest or
negligible in relation to principal outstanding, or even in relation to annual interest flows,
they may play a very important  role initially  in stabilizing the stock of debt. This would be
the case if, for example the portion of interest unable to  be  serviced. which  would
{otherwise  be capitalized,  became the subject of debt conversions by mutual agreement.
Conversion  of eligible foreign exchange debt service to a long-term local currency
bond is a Lummon  mechanism for financing debt for development swaps.  This can be
acceptable even when an inflationary environment threatens the ability of the recipient
implementing  organization to conserve the underlying capital.  (In any case, many debtor
governments do  not allow  significant levels of  capital formation in  non-profit, non
governmental  organizations). Given the tradeoffs faced by the project sponsors, it is far
more important to secure a reliable source of long-term local currency funding for the
development activity.
C. WVhat  Would Qualifv as Eligible Debt when Proposing a Conversion?
During the 1980s, commercial  banks reduced their exposure to a large number of
low income and lower middle income countries, and in many cases retreated from new
lending altogether, even to the private sector.  The bulk of public sector obligations in
7  It should bc mentioned that large and highly visible commercial projects funded by conversions  of commercial
sovereign  debt that are not undertaken  in the context  of an overall  one-time  workout,  may even have  an adverse  impact
on the overall  debt picture. If large amounts  of commercial  debt are purchased  by investors  on the secondary  market
to consuiamate  a deal  e.g sale  of airline,  the value  of the remaining  debt outstanding  can increase  dramatically.  There
are at least two reasons:  i) the standard  supply  and demand  effect, resulting from a sharp increase  in the number  of
buyers  on the secondary  market,  and ii) the market  perceives  that the probability  of being  repaid on the remaining  debt
outstanding  has increased,  due to the retirement  of a large portion  of original  claims.-7 -
such countries is to official creditors, and many governments  are in arrears on this official
debt.8
Conversions of  official bilateral debt9 have not been permitted until recently.
However, nearly five years of accumulated experience with innovative debt for nature
swaps involving commercial debt have not gone unnoticec by creditor governments.
Growing concerns about transnational development issues such as global warming and
preservation of  biodiversity, which debt-burdened developing countries do  not have
adequate resources to address, prompted a policy change about eighteen months ago.
In September 1990 the Paris Club (of official creditors) introduced a series of new
repayment conditions for lower middle income countries. Rescheduled  repayment p_riods
were lengthened, and a number of debt for development conversions to local currency
were for the first time permitted in principle for such countries.  Agreements must be
voluntary and bilateral. There are no limits on conversions of government  to government
loans, but a case-by-case  ceiling will apply to guaranteed commercial credits.  It is likely
that the treatment will be extended to low income countries and middle income countries
in the near future.
Conversions of official bilateral debt potentially open the door to a whole new
application of the debt conversion technique.  Unlike commercial creditors.  bilateral
creditors are unlikely to ask for control of public assets in the debtor country.  They are
more likely, instead, to lend their support to development-oriented  activities, if presented
with well-designed  proposals.  Requesting  bilateral debt conversion as well as additional
hard currency funding support if necessary for traditionally underfunded sectors can be
clearly defended  in most instances,  if a well defined action plan for use of the diverted  debt
service is on the table. The bottlenecks in practice are often institutional. This problem is
tackled separately in a later section of the paper.
Applying the Paris Club's current criteria, the lower middle income countries that
are now eligibie to propose conversions of bilateral debt are Cameroon, Congo, Cote
d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, Jordan,
Morocco, Nicaragua,  Nigeria, Paraguay,  Peru, Philippines,  Poland and Senegal. However,
it is possible that other countries with debt servicing difficulties, where there is enough
initiative  and credibility on  the part of debt managers, could  also  benefit from this
mechanism by preparing proposals attractive to creditors.
D.  When Could Commercial  Debt be Used in "Debt for Development"?
While commcrcial bank creditors (London Club) are generally a long shot for
sponsoring development projects, it may be worthwhile pursuin, individual banks holding
8  However,  there is no secondary  market  (yet)  for claims  by the official  sector
9  Both concessional Official Development Assistance and other government to government loans, as well as
commnercial  loans guaranteed  by creditor  govemmenlts  or their export  credit agencies-8 -
small amounts of debt.  As with all creditors, they are faced with the need to avoid the
appearance of outright debt forgiveness, which is an admission of poor judgement in the
past, and runs contrary to their obligations io stockholders expecting dividends.  At the
same time, small commercial  creditors are faced swith  the complexities  and uncertainties  of
valuation of expected future debt service payments, as well as the administrative  costs of
keeping track of these claims, participating in negotiations, etc.  Since the oebt probably
represents  a  small portion  of  their  portfolio,  they  may be  receptive  to  a  proposal
requestin,  a donation of their claim to a good cause, provided the case is presented in a
c  vAncing  manner.  Credibility of the project and confidence in the debt negotiators are
important, since the bank will not wish to be implicated in a future scandal related to its
donated claims.
Another category of commercial  creditor that debt negotiators may wish to try and
interest in development projects, is the rare bank which anticipates further business from
a developing country in debt difficulties (the bank is hopefully also currently a major
creditor).  There are always creditors with long-standing  relationships, or simply with too
much invested in a given debtor to pull out altogether.  Such a bank would be interested
in keeping the debt from becoming worthless and in developing goodwill in that country.
Again, armed with a selection of attractive, long term development p.  grams, the debt
negotiating team could discreetly present a proposal to the particular bank.  A debt
conversion (or donation of claims to a particular sectoral reform program) would be a
simple means for the creditor of  addressing communities in the country that may have
growing influence and that  are  not normally  sympathetic to  a  commercial bank:ag
perspective.  DLebt  negotiators should be perceived as  credible and realistic in  their
description of proposed action plans (it helps if other influential  agencies are also involved
in some way with the project, or even in some cases, if the creditor commercial banks are
partly owned by the government  of the creditor country).  If there is a possibility for the
creditor to  "buy goodwill" over a long period, which is consistent with his long tern
business interests, then a private visit to the creditor's offices could yield more debt relief
than public negotiations  in the London Club forum.  (Waivers  from other creditors are not
required in the case of a donation).
E. Inflationary  Impact
Any assessment of the potential inflationary  impact of a given debt conversion for
sovereign obligations will mainly depend on the current level of debt service payments
being made on the debt to be converted. If the country does not currently service the debt,
then any cash disbursement as a result of a swap will be inflationary since there is a net
cash flow dis-saving from the "debt reduction". In addition, debt for development swaps
are unlikely to lead to an increase  in productive  capacity,  which would have partially offset
the inflationary  impact.
Even in the case of foreign debt which is being serviced, the government should
avoid a large up front lump-sum disbursement of local currency from the central bank,
which would have a directly expansionary effect on the money supply.  The lump-sum
disbursement of a significant  portion of the outstanding  face value of the debt would most
probably ey eed the debt service saved through retirement  of the instrument.-9-
Conversion to  local currency bonds has no immediate effect on  the domestAc
currency since it involves the exchange of an external debt instrument for an internal debt
instrument usually with lower face value.  If the local currency bonds are issued  ith a
termequvalnt  o orJoner  hanthe  retired foeandbt.  then debt swaps may not have
ninflationa= ect.  Swaps to non-financial assets would Lb ieast inflationary because
this would not involve an increase  in the money supply at all.
F.  Debt for Development Strategy
The  suggested  strategy  in  this  paper  focuses  on  sectors  with  developinent
projects requiring local currency funding.  Such activities, for obvious reasons, have
traditionally been of less interest to commercial bankers and other creditors who are in
search of tangible assets or foreign exchange-generating  activities as conversion vehicles.
.nis opening represents a tremendous opportunity  for debt managers, as well as a burden
on them to prepare suitable proposals to take advantage of the new rules regarding the
eligibility of bilateral debt for conversions in some countries. We argue that some of the
environmental, social sector, water  sanitation and other infrastructu.e activities already
approved, or substantial policy reforms about to be adopted by the debtor government,
coald in principle benefit  directly from additional  funding  support  through  debt conversions,
initially using official  debt, and subsequently  maybe even commercial  debt.
A distinction must be made between:
(i)  the  overall  size  of  the  debt  conversion  program,  which  is  based  on
macroeconomic  considerations  and defined by the debt negotiating  team, and
(ii)  the economic sectors which will serve as vehicles to execute the program.
The prerequisite is for a country's debt managers and debt negotiating team to be
well informed about the potential areas in which domestic development activities may be
of interest to foreign creditors, ii, addition to the more common industrial sector activities
for which private investment is sought.  Creditors may agree to designate a development
activity as the legal recipient of debt service payments which are owed to the foreign
creditor. All debt service payments foregone by the creditor are in effect "donated" to the
sector.  For this reason, the term "donor" and "creditor" are used interchangeably in the
context of debt for development  swaps from this poiaIt  on.
Ideally, donor support should be solicited for a  given sector based on a so!id
sectoral strategy.  However, in practice donors often wisO to be informed of specific
projects  that  would  be supported,  since these  offer  a  more convenient  method of
monitoring  (and demonstrating)  their financial support.  Again, the debtor should be well-
prepared with projects or proiect  proposals that add credibility to  proposed sectoral
reforms.  This will also guard against the debt conversion  process from becoming "donor-
driven", which would in turn result in low commitment  on the part of local authorities, and
plant the seeds for later difficulties in strategy implementation.  Ideal candidates for debt
conversion projects are those which do not represent interference with a government's-10-
domestic priority  setting procedures, but instead cover  activities already directly  or
indirectly  approved,  for which inadequate funds are available.
Another important issue is the institutional identity of the agent responsible for
receiving  the  proceeds  of  the  debt  conversion  and  carrying  out  the  agreed  upon
development activity.  Ideally, it should be an  xis  institution that is strengthened  to
carry out its new role.  Suitable candidates may be a local NGO, if necessary receiving
technical advice from a counterpart international  NGO or from the donor.  Representatives
from the relevant ministry should be 'volved  in the execution  of the development  activity,
if only to ensure coiisitency with the government's  sectoral strategy. This would also be
determined on a case by case basis of course--in some cases the ministry itself may be
the most suitable, while in others a holding company or a separate endowment would be
appropriate.  The public or private  sector identity will also vary case by case.  For
convenience, we simply refer to the agent as a local NGO in the institutional section of
this paper but this is not meant to imply that a local NGO is always the superior choice.
Only in extreme cases should a brand new institution be set up for the purpose of
receiving the proceeds and channeling them to the sector. This paper frequently refers to
"setting up designated trust  funds"; this is a  useful vehicle that  is elaborated on  in
another section, but again, a trust fund  r  e may not be suitable in all contexts. and is
used for illustration more than anything else.
G.  "program  versus Project": Potential Dangers of an Uncoordinated  Approach
All proposed debt conversions (including debt-equity) should support a well-
defined sectoral strategy, even though at times it may be easier to secure a particular
donor's support for an individual project.  It is worth underlining the risks of a piecemeal
approach to funding stray projects in the social sector or elsewhere through conversions  of
bilatoral debt.  In theory, the debtor government may succeed in persuading a particular
creditor may to earmark the local currency equivalent of their debt service proceeds to
benefit a rural health project, while a different creditor may be talked into similarly
supporting  a proposed or ongoing literacy project. The government would realize a small
benefit from cancelling the foreign exchange obligations to those creditors, and instead
making local currency payments to  the two designated projects in different  sectors.
Howver,  earmarking  in this manner may rsult  in Quite  a random and possibly unsuitable
set of projects srving  as vehicles for debt conversions.
In fact, such a random approach  may be in conflict with the overali funding strategy
for a given  r.  Specifically,  coordination  among  donors is difficult to achieve, and there
may be little or no incentive on the part of various potential  beneficiaries  to bring it about.
A  loosely  managed  debt  conversion  process  risks  running  into  conflict  with
macroeconomic  objectives, most notably money supply targets.  The other big risk is that
major creditors would suddenly conclude that the policy dialogue was being undermined,
and would withdraw their overall support.
This is why the debt for development swap tool should be used transparently to
support a well-defined sectoral strategy, and preferably an ovsrall debt  strate-  e.gcon-version of  a certain  percentage  of  arrears to  stabilize  the debt  stock.  In particular,
when creditors are approached  by the debtor with ideas for debt for development,  then theC
"marketing  tool'  used  should  be  sectoral  strategy  and  any  proposed  policy  chanies.
rather than a single project.
III.  Examples  of Existing  Debt  for  Development  Conversions 1 0
A group of Bolivian organizations has proposed to swap a quarter  of the country's
remaining US$209 million commercial bank debt for schemes to help impoverished children
and  preserve  Bolivian  culture.  The  plan  calls  for  the  Bolivian  government  to  pay  a
premium of 50% on the secondary market  price of the debt, the same as it pays on more
conventional  debt-equity  swaps.  The  voluntary  organizations  involved  will  receive
between US$7.5  and  13.5 million (equivalent)  to spend on water and  health care projects
for  children,  to  be  monitored  by a  number  of established  agencies  including  Save  the
Children.  USAID will provide the main funding for the swaps, with Save the Children and
Foster Parents providing another US$5-9 million.
There  are  a  number  of  other  creative  deals  currently  proposed  in  at  least  ten
L,ountries.  Although  a number of  sectors have been declared  eligible,  most  transactions
concluded  tc date are in the debt for  nature area; health  and education  are mentioned  as
priority sectors for future deals.  Some projects are in the process of being approved, while
others  are in the implementation  stage.  All concluded  transactions  are with  commercial
bank debt.
The government  of Peru formally approved health projects  organized  by the Fund
for Private Assistance  in International  Development  using  debt for development.  About
US$5 million of Peru's US$21 billion foreign debt will be swapped for projects focusing on
primary care and community health services for the poor.
Ecuador  operated  a formal  deDt for development  program  from  October  1989 to
June  1991.  Originally the face value of eligible debt was limited to US$j0  million.  It has
now been raised to US$150 million, and the coverage is widened to include agriculture and
other social projects.  About 10 transactions totalling US$26 million have been completed.
Ecuador is currently  renegotiating  the terms of its commercial debt and seeking to extend
the program.
Also,  in  August  1990  Harvard  University  and  a  local  educational  foundation
announced  a debt  swap  that will convert a part of Ecuador's  US$11 billion  debt into an
educational  fund for Ecuadoran  students.  Harvard  buys US$5 million of Ecuadoran  debt
on the secondary market at 15% of face value, spending US$750,000.  The local foundation
receives  the debt as a donation and converts it to local currency bonds at the central bank,
receiving 50% of face value or US$2.5 million.  The bonds can be sold on the local market
at a discount  of  15%, and income  from the sale will be used to buy dollar  denominated
10  These are summarized  from Section 11  of "Recent Developments  in Debt Conversion Programs and Conversion
Activities"  Septeriber  1991,  by W. Sung  and R. Troia-12-
securities that will form the capital base of the scholarship fund.  The interest from the
endowment covers about five scholarships a year to Harvard, and the local currency is
used for research, internship and other activities domestically.
The government of Venezuela has approved a special debt for education program
for US$100 million of face value debt in early 1991, under which US institutions should
develop a written collaborative  agreement with Fundacion Gran Mariscal de Ayacucho, an
educational  foundation  in Venezuela, covering the utilization of the conversion proceeds.
The redeemer of the debt acquired on the secondary market would receive 100% of the
face value in bolivars. Under this program the NGO can maintain the proceeds in bolivars
or reconvert  up to  80% into dollars to  establish a foreign currency trust fund.  The
unconverted  proceeds  would  be  maintained  in  an  investment  fund  in  Venezuela.  The
Ayacucho  Foundation  will  administer  the  two  trusts,  and  will  select  Venezuelan
scholarship  recipients.
From the official creditor's side, US govemment initiatives are the most prominent.
Under the Enterprise  for  the Americas  Initiative  (EAI)  announced  in June  1990, the US
introduced a nes  debt reduction program which emphasizes swaps of qualified US
bilateral claims on a set of western hemisphere countries to promote foreign investment,
environment  conservation,  and other  developmental  projects.  The  program's  first  debt
write-down  and  debt  for environment  swap was approved  by the U.S  Treasury  in June
1991.  Under the arrangement,  Chile's PL 480  "Food for Peace" debt will be reduced by
40% from US$39 million to US$23 million.  The interest payments on the remaining
principal will be paid in local currency  to a local fund responsible  for implementing  selected
environmental projects.  An important precondition for partial debt forgiveness is the
Interamerican Development  Bank's final approval for an investment sector reform loan to
Chile.  Following the Chilean precedent, the second and third deals were signed with
Bolivia and  Jamaica to reduce  their food  for peace debts  by  80% in  August  1991.  The
former will reduce the food assistance  debt from US$38 million to US$7.7 million and the
latter from US$271  million to US$54  million. Chile could also be eligible for similar write-
down and swap arrangements on its US$304 million AID debt once the US congress
passes the relevant legislation.  Bolivia, Jamaica, Colombia and Uruguay are the next
likely candidates for IDB investment loans, and thereby may be eligible for bilateral debt
reduction under EAI.
Under the SEED Law (Support for East European Democracy Act of November
1989), the US President may undertake  the discounted sale of US government  claims on a
subset of  East European governments to  private purchasers  if  the debtor  has taken
substantial steps towards democracy and political pluralism. To authorize such a sale of
debt, the new holder must undertake to exchange the claims for local currency, policy
commitments, other  complementary assets needed  for development,  or  equity in  a
privatized firm.  To date, this has not been implemented, but it is expected to facilitate
future US investment in this part of the world.
The US has already executed an agreement with the Government of Polar.d under
the Paris  Club framework--Poland wishes to  take up the voluntary swap provision to
institute a debt for environment  conversion. Under the proposal, the Government would
allocate additional  financial resources  in  local currency, equivalent  to  debt  service-13-
payments on up to  10 percent of Poland's debt to the US in order to fund investments
specifically  aimed at alleviating  Poland's  contribution  to global environmental  problems.
Some European creditor governments have also en&aged  in conversion of official
debts (e.g German-Polish  debt conversion to set up a cultural exchange foundation and a
forum for contacts between tradesmen  of the two countries). The arrangements appear to
be on an ad-hoc basis involving modest amounts.  However, riiore creditors are likely to
consider swap options in one forrn or another for selected  developing countries.
IV.  Illustration  of a Hypothetical Debt for Development  Idea
Example 1: Water  supply sector
Background:  Suppose that a particular government is following a strategy
to increase nationwide service coverage / access to safe drinking water.  In
addition to increasing the number of users of the system, the government
also wants to improve the quality of service to existing and new customers.
Because of general budgetary constraints, the government has decided to
focus  on  strengthening  the  financial  position  of  water  companies
nationwide,  mainly through improved cost  recovery.  This involves  a
reassessment of the pricing structure, including the introduction of peak
load pricing in an attempt to delay investments in capacity expansion in the
near future.  Operations and maintenance of  existing capacity will be
emphasized  to  reduce  leakage  and  contamination,  together  with  the
introduction of new monitoring practices regarding metering and billing to
improve cost recovery.  The government  estimates that because of previous
investment  decisions based on over-optimistic  projections of growth, it may
now be able to delay major capacity increases (costing say US$10 million)
for ten years.
Issjue:  As  part  of  the  sectoral  strategy.  the  government  wants  to  set  annual
perfQrmance goals  and  criteria  (including  cost  recovery  targets)  by  which  water
companies  will  be  evaluated,  in  return  for  increasing  managerial  autonomy  and
accgkntabiity.  A key pre-condition  for a successful  outcome is to be able to MdUce  the
associated  unceltainty:  specifically, to  assure the  water companies of  regular local
currency funding availability (at least the government's share of it) for all the agreed-on
O&M expenditures,  and the planned capital investment in year ten in foreign exchangel 1.
O  of course this raises a major  potential  conflict  between  macroeconomic  and sectoral objectives. Circumstances  may
change so that in year 5, for example, it is no longer appropriate for the government to make its prearranged
contribution  to the water trust fund.  In this case it is understood that the government  would revisit the issue with
the donor and other lerders, and would retain the flexibility  required to manage its overall  macroeconomy  ahead of
individual  sectoral  priorities. If this is understood  by all in advance,  this need not  prevent  such agreements  from being
concluded  today,  ceteris  paribus.- 14-
How could debt for development conversions enter this picture?  One way could be as
follows:
The government  makes the following  proposal to a receptive bilateral  creditor:
"This is our strategy for the water supply sector in the next ten years, which is
supported by several multilateral financial institutions... . Under this strategy, we are
committed  to provide X amount  of counterpart funds in local currency. Would you like to
support us by assisting in the provision of the counterpart funds?
Proposal:  "Specifically, we propose a debt conversion of US$20 million of our
bilateral  obligations  to you. In particular,  we request an upfront write-off  of 50%, or US$10
million. For the remaining  US$10 million,  we would  like to do the following:
(i)  cancel the existing repayment schedule, under which we had committed to
repaying equal installments of remaining principal over the next five years.
Instead, we will pay the entire US$10 million in a single installment  in year 15;
(ii)  we will make annual interest payments at y% on the full US$10 million into a
designated water supply trust fund in local currency.  These amounts will be
used to fund the O&M needs of our nationwide network of water companies.
The water supply trust fund will also have title to the US$10 million payment in
year 15.  Thus the US$10 million is effectively converted into a dual currency
bond, with  the  principal  preserved in  foreign  exchange  and  the  interest
payments (indexed) in local currency;
(iii)  our foreign exchange outflows to you will be reduced by the full amount of
original interest and principal payments associated with US$20 million in face
value of debt;
(iv)  we will guarantee  our ability to make the US$10 million payment in year 15 by
purchasing a financial instrument today that will mature to a value of US$10
million by that date, and pledging it to the water supply trust fund; and
(v)  the US$10 million to be paid into the trust fund in year 15 will be utilized to
further support our future sectoral strategy. We are not a priori advocating an
earmarking  of the US$10  million for our future outlays for capital investments  in
the sector. In fact, we expect that these will take place in year 10, while these
particular funds will not be available before year 15. However, we would lik-e
to utilize these funds as additional resources for future sectoral priorities to the
extent possible."
Reaction  to PMroosal: It is not necessary for all elements of the initial proposal to
be accepted by the creditor--the arrngement could still work even if there were no debt
reduction granted. The counterproposal  from the creditor could be to maintain claims on
the full US$20 million, i.e not to grant the 50% writeoff requested.  Furtheimore, the
creditor could also refuse to give up claims on the principal of US$20 million, but still
support the sector by forgoing  only  interes  payments.  and  agr  tairest- 15  -
rning.  i  annual rather  than semiannual.  This method would offer debt relief  without
debt  reduction  to the government.  To continue  the hypothetical  example,  the following
could be one possible outcome:
A  trust  fund  for  the  water  sector  is  designated  or  set  up  by  the  debtor
government.  The creditor gives this trust fund some form of "custody" for a ten
year  period  over  the  US$20  million  which  is  owed  to  the  creditor  by  the
government.  The trust fund then "lends" this amount to the government in local
currency,  at a y% interest  rate to  be adjusted  for inflation  at regular  intervals.
The  principal  is to  be  repaid  by the government  to the  trust  fund  in  a  single
installment  in year  ten,  in  foreign  exchange.  The  trust  fund  then  repays  the
foreign  creditor  immediately.  What  benefits  does  this  seemingly  roundabout
approach result in?
The government benefits from:
(i)  a de  facto restructuring  of its obligation  as follows:  annual  foreign exchange
outflows on installments related to the US$20 million amount over the next ten
years are eliminated;
(ii)  since  it now  has  a  single  obligation  in  year  10,  it can  buy  a  zero-coupon
security  today for US$8.44  millionl 2 , which will grow to the required  US$20
million in the form of a bullet maturity in year ten.  The entire  US$20 million
foreign exchange obligation can thus  be defeased  by a one time investment of
.-ound US$8 million; and
(iii)  the foreign currency  interest expenditures  are also saved,  and made  instead in
local  currency  to  a designated  beneficiary,  the water  trust  fund.  When  the
arrangement  ends in year ten, the zero coupon  matures,  and is passed  back to
the creditor  through the water trust fund.
The water trust fund is assured of a stream of local currency income, preserved  in
real  terms,  for  a  ten  year  period.  This  enables  it to  set  medium  to  long  term  sector
policies  and targets.
The  creditor  has  granted  debt  relief  and  supported  a  sector  considered  to  be
important  for development.  This form of  (local currency) support is perfectly  consistent
with possible additional direct foreign exchange cofinancing by the same creditor.
12  The yield on a ten year US  Treasury  bond is assumed  to be 9% for this calculation. If it is 9.5% then the cost of the
zero coupon falls to US$8.07  million.-16-
Example 2:  Public Enterprise Reform
A  one-shot expenditure where IFI  loan proceeds cannot be  used--e.g.
setting  up  a  fund  for  severance  pay  to  employees  of  public  sector
enterprises to be shut down.
The government, together with IFIs, decides on  a  phased calendar  for
closure of a series of PEs which cannot be privatized. According to existing
labor laws etc, there is a reasonably well-defined estimate of one-time
severance payments accompanying  each closure that must be made to bring
this about.  The government approaches a subgroup of its major bilateral
creditors seeking partial support for this "restructuring  expense" from each.
The severance payments will be in local currency  stretched over a period to
coincide with the timetable for  enterprise  closings. Redirected debt service
in local currency would be channeled as in the previous example to the
managing  entity  or  trust  fund,  to  be  disbursed  to  the  designated
beneficiaries. These could be the individual  enterprises, or a central body.
The severance pay package to laid-off employees could be complemented
with (privately contracted) technical assistance and advice on how to start
a small enterprise, how to leverage the lump-sum severance payment etc.
Example 3:  To Support Financial Sector Development
A conversion of bilateral claims to local currency in order to capitalize a
guarantee fund for loans to small enterprises, or to assist privatization of
state-owned small businesses.
The domestic commercial banking infrastructure of a debtor country may
not be in a position to provide loans to potential entrepreneurs wishing to
buy small businesses being sold by the state.  There may be insufficient
credit history on the applicants, and insufficient institutional capacity in the
financial sector, which moreover may be burdened by massive inherited bad
loans. In spite of this there is often urgency to proceed with privatization,
especially of small establishments, even under such circumstances.  While
the financial sector is gradually being overhauled, a guarantee scheme of
the following  kind may be imagined:
A trust fund is set up, to which a subset of bilateral creditors donate say
US$100  million of debt. There are many ways in which the trust fund could
use its interest earnings on the donated claims to provide guarantees to
commercial  banks for say 50-60% of the local currency loan size to a small
businessman. The commercial  banks may agree to bear 40% but not 100%
of the risk on a loan to an unknown  potential entrepreneur,  and are likely to
welcome this arrangement. Incidentally,  this will provide a welcome boost
to the banks' business, especially if domestic real interest rates have shot
up recently and lending volumes have dropped sharply.- 17 -
The  trust  fund  could  even  ask  banks  to  compete  for  this  business
eventually, by gradually reducing its level of guarantee  as more experience
is accumulated,  thereby forcing banks to improve the quality of their credit
appraisals as they take on more risk.  The borrower would have to pay an
upfront fee  for the guarantee (initially mainly to  eliminate non-serious
borrowers).
These three examples have been presented to illustrate the almost infinite variety
of arrangements that could potentially be concluded with bilateral support, if credible
proposals are prepared, and the macroeconomic  and inflationary effects estimated to the
extent possible in advance.  The arrangements should be reasonably stable, but allow for
necessary flexibility in consultation with the relevant parties, to  adjust to  unforeseen
circumstances.
V.  Key Steps  in a Debt  for Development  Projectl3
A.  Obtaining Necessary Approvals
The project must secure the approval of at least three key parties in the debtor country:
the  government,  the  central  bank  and  an  appropriate  local  non-governmental
organizationl4 that will receive the funds and manage  and execute the project on behalf  of
the supervising ministry.  The latter is the most important party, whose strength will
assure  the  responsible use of  debt  conversion funds.  Once there  is  agreement  in
principle, the project sponsor (who could also be a foreign NGO in partnership  with local
authorities) must negotiate:
(i)  the "exchange  rate" to be applied in converting debt service to local currency,
(i.e whether  the debtor will take responsibility  in local currency  for 100% of the
debt or only a fraction  of it);
(ii)  the conditions of payment (i.e upfront cash, or installments over how many
years, or a local currency  bond etc), and
(iii)  aspects of the program which will directly utilize the proceeds.
B. Determining  and Locating Eligible Debt
The debt instrument  must be obtained--If the country is already eligible to convert
Paris Club debt, this wouid be the best way to initiate a debt for development program,
B  This section  is partly  based on K. Moltke,  Debt for Nature:  An Overview,  p.1
14  As mentioned  earlier,  the entity  is referred  to as an NGO  purely  for convenience.- 18 -
since  the debt  would not have to  be. purchased in  the  secondary market.  Instead,
following bilateral negotiations, the creditor would simply transfer title to a designated
entity.
If  the  debt  to  be  converted is  anything  other  than bilateral  government  to
government,  the involvement  of a third party (e.g foreign NGO) is essential, since debtors
are restricted by legal clauses from acquiring their own commercial obligations in the
secondary market.  The market price of the debt is viewed as a reflection of the market's
expectations that the claim will be serviced; it may also be regarded as the net present
value of expected future debt service on that r  icular obligation.  Clearly, the lower the
price paid by the project sponsor to acquire a  mr lercial claim, the greater the leveraging
potential. However,  the market price is also a c.car indication  of the risks involved.
For countries wishing to initiate debt for development  with commercial  debt, because they
are currently ineligible to  pursue official debt conversions, the  following should be
considered:
(i)  does the proposed project, through its foreign NGO sponsor/partner, tap new
sources of funds (e.g to carry out the purchase of commercial claims), or is it
potentially  in conflict with other fund raising strategies?  what is the opportunity
cost of choosing debt conversions?
(ii)  can creditor banks be persuaded to donate the debt outright, which clearly
represents a new source of funds inaccessible  without the project?
(iii)  are donations of cash available from other sources, (such as development
organizations from  the  country of  the  creditor  bank) for  the  purpose of
purchasing the debt on the market?
(iv)  what are the tax implications  for all concerned?
C. Transfer  of Claims
The transfer of title to the debt may be a complex legal transaction, but possibly
less so in the context of a bilateral agreement if the end-recipient of the local currency
stream is well defined. In the case of commercial  debt, the identity of the purchaser is an
important  decision. The foreign  NGO partner could could acquire the debt and then donate
it to its debtor country-partner organization. In other instances it may be appropriate to
donate the necessary resources to permit a direct acquisition by the implementing NGO.
Otherwise, the debt may be donated directly to  the implementing NGO, acting as an
agent for its partner the foreign NGO.  15
I5  Recent experience with debt for nature projects  supported by conmmercial  claims has shown that well-established
intrnational  conservation organizations  may sometimes  benefit from access to free top quality legal advice in
structuring  such agreements.-19-
D.  Cgonrsionand  Method.of Loal  Cur  yaut
Conversion of  the debt in  accordance with the  :iegotiated agreement reached
between the debtor government and the project sponsor deserves maximum attention.
This can involve:
(i)  local currency bonds (indexed  interest payments?),
(ii)  measures to protect certain sensitive areas, such as purchase of land, passage
of legislation,  relevant policy changes  or other means;
(iii)  the cash payment  in local currency  to redeem the debt, or
(iv)  any combination  of these.
Considerations  determining  the  redemption  price  to  be  paid  by  the  debtor
government are quite different for commercial (debt for equity) versus development
projects.  In the former, the debtor government would be justified in allowing market
forces (competition among interested investors) to bring down the local currency to be
paid by it in exchange  for retiring hard currency  obligations.1 6
However, in the case of debt for development  projects attempts should be made by
project sponsors to  secure as much of the remaining face value in  local currency as
possible.  (The government will of course try to bargain for an upfront cancellation of a
part of the outstanding amount in the context of the deal).  From the project sponsors'
viewpoint, their project is providing a vehicle for the debtor government to obtain debt
relief.  Furthermore, it is on the government's  priority list, and supposedly approved but
short of funds.  In that case the sponsors should try to ensure that maximum gains from
tne cancelled hard currency debt service go to the project. The government's  incentive to
participate lies in the fact that the cash flow requirements of the project can be less of a
burden than the original debt service payments.  In particular, the timing of payments to
the project can be structured such that in net present value terms they constitute a large
debt reduction. These issue's will need to be explicitly addressed during the negotiations
between the project sponsors and the government.
It may be in the interest of both parties to structure a local currency bond with a
longer maturity (e.g 15 years) than the retired debt (e.g 6 years).  In addition, instead of
an amortization schedule, the interest payments could be kept uniform (and adjusted to
remain constant in real terms also) with a single, bullet repayment of principal at the end
of the life of the bond.
The face value of the bond could be the full amount of principal given up by the
original creditor.  Even so, extended local currency repayment terns,  as in the above
example would imply substantial relief for the debtor government. At the same time, as
16  In practice,  this could  be done through  an auction.  or by means  of a "conversion  fee" to be paid to the government,  or by
dcree, redeeming  the  debt at an ainounced  discount  relative  to  face  value.- 20 -
long as the project sponsor was assured of a 15 year local currency funding stream that
would be adjusted for inflation, this would probably  be preferable to a 6 year stream
based on the initial terms of  the retired debt.  The effect of such bonds on the domestic
capital markets would have to be taken into account.  In the Costa Rican case, bonds
issued by the government  to fund environmental  projects could not be sold, so the interest
payments were immediately available only for their intended purpose.  When more cash
was needed, however, the bonds could be used as "collateral"  for loans.
Experience has shown that redemption of the debt with an upfront local currency
payment by the central bank should be avoided because of the expansionary effect on the
money supply.  Also, the debtor government may not have been paying the full debt
service on the face value in any case, and would therefore not save anything by a lump-
sum disbursement  of local currency.
If the debtor was not servicing the debt at all prior to  its conversion, the cash
disbursement to a local project is more inflationary than otherwise, since there are no
cash flow savings, but instead a net cash outflow following the deal.  (This would be the
case even if there was a substantial debt writeoff plus conversion of a small amount of
remaining debt).  Whether or not a government should agree to conversion proposals in
the  context  of  otherwise  zero debt  service,  is  more  fundamentally  related  to  the
government's longer term view of whether and how (at what price) it eventually intends
to settle the outstanding claims.
It is advisable to begin a conversion program in the zero debt service case only
with bilateral claims, for which there is normally no market.  If commercial claims were
used,  this would revive an otherwise "dead" trading  situation, and the  value of  the
outstanding debt stock would be bound to increase.  This would be undesirable, since it
would be purely speculative and not in response to an increase in the debtor's ability to
pay (at least in the near term).
E. Project Implementation
Finally,  the  execution of  the agreed-on development program  should not  be
overlooked in planning the preceding stages of the debt conversion.  This part must be
well planned, especially the role of the private NGO designated as the executing agency
and manager of the pilot project.  (If  there is  a shortage of sectoral experience and
familiarity with the bureaucracy,  the staff of this agency could be supplemented  with some
authorities from the relevant Ministry who are seconded to the project).
The  NGO must  have clear monitorable objectives,  and  should report  on  its
progress to a designated trustee.  Given the importance of such a pilot project in setting
the tone for future debt conversions,  the NGO should be in a position to receive sufficient
backup and  attention  through  the  relevant  Ministry  as  well as  the  National  Debt
Management  authorities, in case of difficulties. It will be helpful if all relevant parties feel
some degree of  ownership of the project, and keep in mind that the pilot project was set
up  explicitly  to  serve as  a  lightning rod  to  raise problems which  require  creative,
homegrown solutions.21 -
If the project is able to attract some modest additional grant funding on top of the
local currency contributions  from the debtor government,  the task of ensuring institutional
cooperation will be greatly facilitated.  It is safe to say that a small grant to al!eviate
some of the day to day bottlenecks for each of the parties concerned in an institutional
dispute, will go a long way towards ensuring better communications and cooperation, as
well as the feeling of having a stake in the project.  If bilateral creditors are involved, and
the project appeals to more than one creditor, it is likely that a small amount of additional
grant funds can be raised from somewhere.  The strategic importance of this cannot be
overstated, and will be greatly appreciated in case communications difficulties start to
slow down project execution.
VI.  Institutional Strengthening
The main challenge in implementing successful  debt conversion deals often lies in
overcoming institutional weaknesses.  A number of groups are typically involved, and
each  group's interests and potential problems must be assessed.  It  is  precisely the
differences in interests which permit a wide range of solutions. The premise of this paper
is that debt conversion projects initiated by debtors, in addition to the financial benefits,
also offer a valuable avenue for institutional strengthening  and synergy.
Large, unanticipated resource inflows can easily create difficult relationships in
traditionally underfunded activities.  Lower than required absorptive capacity and weak
institutional performance on  the part of the proposed recipient is sometimes a major
constraint in the implementation of such conversions. 17 Another factor is insufficient
information  within the debtor's overall decisionmaking  machinery. This often prevents the
debtor from being in a position to bring a suitable project to the creditor's attention, or
even if this is done, the creditor has little confidence that the debtor will be able to fulfil
project related obligations. 18
Even  in  cases  where  creditors  could  be  potentially  interested  in  debt  for
development conversions, they are rarely concluded in the formn  of a project because the
contacts of a domestic sponsor  for social sector projects are unlikely to include those who
would need to approve debt related operations. This may be remedied to some extent if
the government itself pro-actively pursues a pilot debt for development project.  Unless
the institutional constraint is tackled head on, preferably by entering into a small pilot
debt conversion operation as a  "lightning rod" to raise issues and find solutions, the
debtor is probably passing up an opportunity to gain several advantages simultaneously.
17  If a country has no prior experience with debt conversions for development,  and it does not have the time to
experiment with small projects  to build a track record, it may wish to include debt conversions  as one element of
cofinancing  in an already  identified  project.
18  Another important  constraint is liquid:ty  of course, and the debtor's ability to meet debt service obligations  even in
local cuffency.- 22 -
In situations where there are perceived to be skill bottlenecks in the public sector
(e.g in administrative/managerial capacity), debt conversion projects may be a useful,
less-controversial vehicle for bringing in domestic managerial talent from local non-
governmental  organizations. An experimental  pilot project in a social sector could, at the
request of  its  sponsors, be structured so as  to  designate a  non-traditional entity  as
responsible for implementation,  e.g on contract to the relevant ministry. There are no set
rules, other than that the project must pass the test of being judged "deliverable" by its
proposed financial  backers.
Parties with  an ownership stake in  the  debt conversion project  are  likely  to
perceive the benefits of cooperating  in order to gain access to the windfall resources (not
loan  procd)  attached to it.  This windfall (to the sector but not necessarily to the
government budget as a whole) consists of  extra local currency inflows and possibly in
future, small additional  hard currency  grants from "bandwagon  effect" cofinanciers.
A.  Trust Funds as a Possible Component  of "Institutional Infratructure" to Carry Out a
Pilot Debt Conversionl9
A trust fund is money transferred or set aside for the benefit of another party and
held by  a trustee.  Essential elements are the designated beneficiaries, one  or more
trustees and an identified fund.  A trustee has legal title over the fund and a fiduciary
responsibility  to the beneficiaries  to follow the terms and comply with the applicable  laws.
Trustees generally represent the various interested parties among the beneficiaries and
the funding sources--the precise role and accountability of these trustees would vary
according  to the location and the purposes of the particular trust.
National environmenta; trust funds have been established in several countries in
connection with debt for nature swaps.  Important benefits could be derived from the use
of trust funds for the management  of concessions  made by foreign creditors and/or special
purpose grant funding:
--  leveraging available funds for financing recurrent local costs;
--  expanding the absorptive capacities of implementing
organizations;
--  building credibility with donors and establishing a case for
receiving  additional  or continued  support;
--  facilitating transnational  or experimental  projects by presenting a
convenient  mechanism  for "burden  sharing" in terms of costs;
19  The  notes on Trust  Funds  are  partly  based  on the Draft  paper  titled  "Trust  Funds  and  Endowments  as a Biodi. -rsity
Conservation  Tool"  dated  2.28.91,  author  not  named- 23 -
--  providing a convenient forum for the representation  of diverse interests
without creating a complicated  bureaucratic  framework.
B.  The Direct ApDroach--Debt  Conversion  as Part of a Largse  Package
It is advisable to begiki  with a modest foreign exchange value debt conversion,
relative to the assumed institutional capacity existing in the country.  This is especially
true at the "lightning  rod" stage, where the debtor is experimenting  with a view to raising
and solving internal institutional issues and establishing credibility.  The project itself
could of course be sizeable. with a number of components  and a range of funding sources
(of which the debt conversion would be one).20 The main message is to begin explicit
consideration of the role of debt conversions in the above-mentioned sectors without
delay.
At  the  same  time,  the  relevant  ministries  and  other  groups  (e.g  project
beneficiaries) would be strengthened in  the effort  to coordinate the  various funding
sources and implement such a project.  Designated participants would have a first hand
opportunity to exercise accountability  in proiect management  on a small scale.  A small
but successful pilet could open the door to progressively larger and more advantageous
conversions in the same sector.
International counterpart NGOs may be approached directly with proposals from
the  sector policy making level to  determine if  there is  interest in  funding specific
development  'project  ideas either through debt conversions  or special purpose grants.  The
debt managers (usually Ministry of Finance or Central Bank staff) can become involved at
any stage, preferably up front, to assess the local currency contribution and implications
for debt retirement  and inflation.
The process of "marketing" projects inside and outside the government zo  raise
funding which would otherwise not be accessible  to the country, and gaining insights into
potential donors' reactions through informal consultations, will be a valuable experience
for domestic project sponsors. If a sufficient number of bilateral and international NGOs
become involved, the project will have independent  access to a vast network of additional
backup (expertise, international experience,  resources) if needed.  Institutional issues for
handling the local cost funding as well as the oversight of the project will have to be
clarified internally,  e.g setting up a trust fund etc.  Once the financing plan is implemented,
designated project  managers must  be ready  to  take over  and  keep external  donors
informed of progress at regular intervals.
As  one  observer  has  succinctly stated,  "it will  require  the  [creation] of  an
international  community  of  persons  in  [development]  organizations,  banks  and
government,  knowledgeable  about the issues involved, and sufficiently  confident of mutual
20  However,  it may  be argued  tnat this will  not sufficiently  demnonstrate  the specific  contribution  of those managing  the
debt convetsion  in order to establish  credibility. On the other hand, if all projects  in the country  are mega-sized,  or if
the country  is unable to interest creditors  in small  pilot environmental  or social sector  projects, this may be the only
way.- 24 -
relationships to be able to  transact many details at a distance..  .Perhaps the long-term
lesson from debt/nature will be that conservation organizations and banks need to work
together more closely to ensure that the financial  creadvity of the banking conmnunity  and
the  expertise  of  the  conservation community can  combine  to  contribute  to  more
sustainable  economnies  in the Third World."Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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